The security of iterated message authentication code (MAC) algorithms is considered, and in particular those constructed from unkeyed hash functions. A new MAC forgery attack applicable to all deterministic iterated MAC algorithms is presented, which requires on the order of 2 n=2 known text-MAC pairs for algorithms with n bits of internal memory, as compared to the best previous general attack which required exhaustive key search. A related key recovery attack is also given which applies to a large class of MAC algorithms including a strengthened version of CBC-MAC found in ANSI X9.19 and ISO/IEC 9797, and envelope MAC techniques such as \keyed MD5". The security of several related existing MACs based directly on unkeyed hash functions, including the secret pre x and secret su x methods, is also examined.
I. Introduction
Message authentication code (MAC) algorithms have received widespread use for data integrity and data origin authentication, e.g. in banking applications 15, 31] . They are closely related to hash functions, which play a fundamental role in many areas of modern cryptography, including a primary role in conjunction with digital signature algorithms. When combined with a secret key, hash functions may provide conventional techniques for message authentication; in this case it is preferable that the secret key be a distinct secondary input.
Relative to the extensive work on the design and analysis of hash functions 40], little attention has been given to the design of e cient MACs until recently 6, 7, 8, 41, 48] . This evidently resulted from the adoption of several early MAC proposals as standards which proved adequate in practice, including constructions based on the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) and Cipher FeedBack (CFB) modes of a block cipher 1, 2, 28, 29] . By far the most common is the CBC mode (CBC-MAC), theoretical support for which was recently given 5]. Another early proposal dating back to 1983, the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA) 13, 14, 28] , is a current ISO standard for which weaknesses of concern have only recently been raised 41, 42, 44] . MAA is relatively fast in software (about 40 per cent slower than MD5); its primary disadvantage historically was that the 32-bit result is considered unacceptably short for many applications. Recent research on authentication codes has resulted in very fast, scalable, and so-called unconditionally secure constructions 30, 34, 51] , which require relatively short keys, and also 48] (see 4] for a summary of these an other schemes); their disadvantage is that a di erent key must be used for every message. If this is not acceptable, one can generate the key using a cryptographically strong pseudo-random string generator, but the resulting scheme is then (at most) computationally secure.
In the early 1990's, Rivest proposed two very fast hash functions: MD4 46] and MD5 47] . Other hash functions based on these were subsequently introduced, including RIPEMD 45], SHA- 1 24] , and RIPEMD- 160 20] . In software, these hash functions have throughput as much as one order of magnitude higher than DES 22] . Several factors motivated their adoption as the basis for MAC algorithms: the additional implementation and deployment e ort required to adopt these as MACs is minimal (code for the underlying unkeyed hash function can be called directly); MACs based on these outperform most other available options; and such MACs, avoiding the use of encryption algorithms, may have preferential export status. Consequently, MAC constructions based on these hash functions were adopted in Kerberos 35] , SNMP 26] , and SSL 25] , and gained favor in the IPsec working group of the IETF 32, 38] .
The current paper presents a new cryptanalytic method applicable to all deterministic iterated MACs, including MAA and CBC-MAC. The technique involves nding collisions on known text-MAC pairs after which a few additional chosen text-MAC pairs allow MAC forgery. The attack requires (2 n=2 ) known text-MAC pairs (here n is the bitlength of the MAC's internal memory, i.e. chaining variable), whereas the best previous general attack on MAC algorithms was an exhaustive key search. An extension of the new technique, also described, provides a more powerful attack in special cases. Three existing proposals for MAC algorithms based on hash functions are then analyzed: the secret pre x method, the secret su x method, and the envelope method combining these. For the secret pre x and su x methods, a systematic analysis is given which generalizes the known attacks. For the envelope method, application of the new general attack illustrates that earlier arguments 49] regarding the security level of this method, which claimed that security was exponential in the sum of the lengths of the secret keys used, are incorrect. Finally, variants of these methods are shown to be susceptible to more serious attacks which actually allow key recovery. These variants include keyed MD5 as speci ed per Internet RFC 1828 38] and the strengthened CBC-MAC (hereafter CBC-MAC-Y) included in ANSI X9. 19 2] and ISO/IEC 9797 29] .
The conclusion is that many approaches which construct MACs directly from hash functions (particularly those which use the hash function as a \black box" without modifying its external interface, and involving only a single call thereof), achieve a security level signi cantly less than that suggested by the size of their parameters. In addition, the new attack calls into question the strength of MAA and CBC-MAC, including CBC-MAC-Y.
The sequel is organized as follows. Section II provides background de nitions and reviews several existing MAC proposals. Section III presents a new general forgery attack on MACs, and an extension thereto. Section IV analyzes the security of various MAC proposals, taking into account this forgery attack. Section V presents three key recovery attacks, the rst speci cally on CBC-MAC-Y, and the latter two applicable to many envelope-type MAC constructions; all three are based in part on the central idea of the new forgery attack. Section VI provides a partial summary, and concluding remarks are given in Section VII.
II. De nitions and Background
A hash function h maps bitstrings of arbitrary nite length into strings of xed length. Given h and an input x, computing h(x) must be easy. 1 First one may de ne hash functions not involving secret parameters, as follows. A one-way hash function must provide two properties: preimage resistance (it must computationally infeasible to nd any input which hashes to any pre-speci ed output), and second preimage resistance (it must be computationally infeasible to nd any second input which has the same output as any speci ed input). For an ideal one-way hash function with m-bit result, nding a preimage or a second preimage requires expected (2 m ) operations. A collision resistant hash function is a one-way hash function that provides the additional property of collision resistance (it must be computationally infeasible to nd a collision, i.e. two distinct inputs that hash to the same result). For an ideal collision resistant hash function with m-bit result, no attack nding a collision requires less work than a birthday or square root attack of (2 m=2 ) operations.
A MAC is a hash function with a secondary input, the secret key K. Given h, an input x, and the secret key K, computing h(x) must be easy; note K here is assumed to be an implicit parameter of h(x). The strongest condition one may impose on a MAC is as follows: without knowledge of the secret key, it must be computationally infeasible to perform an existential forgery, i.e. to nd any random message and its corresponding MAC. In contrast, for a selective forgery, an opponent is required to determine the MAC for a message of their own choosing. For a practical attack, one often requires that the forgery is veri able, i.e. that the MAC is known to be correct (or correct with probability very close to 1). Here it is assumed that the opponent is capable of performing a chosen text attack, i.e. may obtain MACs corresponding to a number of messages of their choice. A stronger notion is that of adaptive chosen text attack, in which an opponent's requests may depend on the outcome of previous requests. To be meaningful, a forgery must be for a message di erent than any for which a MAC was previously obtained.
For an ideal MAC with m-bit result, any method to nd the k-bit key is as expensive as an exhaustive search of expected (2 k ) operations. For a MAC which behaves as a random mapping (which is optimal), the expected number of text-MAC pairs required for veri cation of such an attack is approximately dk=me. An opponent who has identi ed the correct key can compute the MAC for any message; that is, key recovery allows selective forgery. If the opponent knows no text-MAC pairs, or if m < k, his best strategy may be to simply guess the MAC corresponding to a chosen message; the probability of success is 1=2 m . The disadvantage of a guessing attack is that it is not veri able. A further desirable property of an ideal MAC is that nding a second preimage should require expected (2 m ) known text-MAC pairs. In some settings (e.g. multi-destination electronic mail 39]) it may be desirable that this requires expected (2 m ) o -line MAC computations even for someone with knowledge of the key.
Most hash functions h, and most MACs, are iterative processes which hash inputs of arbitrary length by processing successive xed-size b-bit blocks of the input x, divided into t blocks of b bits each, x 1 through x t . If the bitlength of x is not a multiple of b, x is padded using an unambiguous padding rule. h can then be described as:
Here f is the compression function of h, and H i is the n-bit chaining variable, n m, resulting after stage i. IV is short for initial value, which is a xed constant. In the case of a MAC, one often applies an output transformation g to H t , yielding the m-bit MAC result h(x) = g(H t ). In the simplest case, g is the identity mapping. The secret key may be introduced in the IV , in the compression function f, and in the output transformation g. CBC-MAC, standardized in ANSI X9. Many MAC algorithms derived from e cient hash functions have been proposed, including the secret pre x method, the secret su x method, and several variants of the secret envelope method. The secret pre x method consists of prepending a secret key K 1 to the message x before the hashing operation: MAC(x) = h(K 1 kx) for h an unkeyed hash function. If the key (possibly padded) consists of a complete block, this corresponds to a hash function with a secret IV . This method was suggested for MD4 independently by Tsudik 49] and by the Internet Security and Privacy Working Group for use in the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) 26]. In the 1980s this was already proposed for at least two other hash functions (for example 11]). The secret su x method speci es that a secret key K 2 be appended to the message: MAC(x) = h(xkK 2 ). This construction was proposed for SNMP (see Galvin et al. 26] ).
The envelope method 49] combines the pre x and su x methods. One prepends a secret key K 1 and appends a secret key K 2 to the message input: MAC(x) = h(K 1 kxkK 2 ).
Arising from the IP Security (IPsec) working group of the IETF, RFC 1828 38], a proposed standard for authentication of IP (Internet Protocol) datagrams, speci es a variant of this method using MD5 and a single key K: MAC(x) = h(KkpkxkK) (see also 32]). Here p denotes some padding bits chosen such that Kkp lls the rst 512-bit block (here b = 512). RFC 1828 allows a variable length key, but mandates support for bitlengths up to 128 bits. RFC 1828 was used in version 2.0 of the Secure Sockets Layer standard (SSL 2.0). Although it may be supported by a security proof under assumptions regarding the pseudorandomness of MD5 7] , Section V demonstrates that this scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery attack if the unkeyed hash function h has a padding mechanism such as that of MD5.
The approach of the envelope method was taken one step further in the construction called MDx- MAC 41] . Important design elements are that three subkeys are derived from the input key, one of which is involved in every iteration of the compression function. This o ers better protection against possible undiscovered weaknesses of the underlying hash function, and imposes less demanding requirements on the compression function (cf. Section V.D), without a ecting the throughput. It is further recommended in MDx-MAC to keep only half of the output bits (a 64-bit result in case of MD5); the forgery attack of Section III then requires a large number of chosen texts (aside from known texts). Finally, to preclude a key recovery attack (Section V.B), the trailing subkey in MDx-MAC is positioned in a separate block.
An alternate approach to the construction of MACs is given by Bellare et al. 6] : here a provably secure construction is presented based on a nite pseudo-random function, which can be instantiated with a block cipher or a hash function. The scheme has the additional advantage that it is parallelizable and incremental. More recently, Bellare et al. 8] have rigorously examined the security of the construction named HMAC, de ned as MAC(x) = h((K p 2 )kh((K p 1 )kx)) and proven it is secure provided that h(:) is collision resistant for random and secret IV , and that the complete output of the compression function f is hard to predict when its rst input is random and secret. Before applying the strings p 1 and p 2 (with p 1 6 = p 2 ), one pads K out with zeroes to a full b-bit block. Despite two calls to h, the second is on a short (e.g. two-block) input and thus overall the construction remains quite e cient. This scheme has been included in the informational Internet RFC 2104 9] . An earlier version of this scheme (without padding) was proposed in the note of Kaliski and Robshaw 32] , with the option to choose K 2 = K 1 . Another variant (proposed in a draft of 8] and included in SSL 3.0) used the strings p 1 and p 2 to pad out K to a b-bit block.
III. General Forgery Attack on MAC Algorithms
A new attack applicable to all (deterministic) iterated MACs is described here. The parameters (running time and text requirements) depend only on the bitsize n of the chaining variables and on the bitsize m of the hash result. The attacks are probabilistic, but the attackers can verify whether or not it will succeed; moreover, the success probability grows quadratically with the number of texts, which implies that it is very easy to make it arbitrarily close to 1. Initially (Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2), no assumptions are made about the texts being hashed. Subsequently, an optimization is given for the case that texts have a common sequence of s trailing blocks (Proposition 3). Then the implications on CBC-MAC and MAA are discussed.
A. Basic Results
Propositions 1 and 2 below are facilitated by the following de nitions and Lemma 1. Let g be the output transformation as de ned above. Let (x; x 0 ) be a pair of message inputs with h(x) = g(H t ) and h(x 0 ) = g(H 0 t ).
De nition 1 A chaining variable collision is said to occur when for some i t, H i = H 0 i , i.e. the intermediate chaining values coincide. If the messages x and x 0 di er in their respective remaining portions subsequent to a chaining variable collision, then in general H t and H 0 t will di er. An internal collision is said to occur when a chaining variable collision results in the situation where H t = H 0 t ; this may happen for example when the remaining message portions following a chaining variable collision are identical. In the following it will be assumed that g is deterministic (i.e. involves no randomization, but rather is a deterministic function of its inputs); an internal collision then yields a MAC collision. If H t 6 = H 0 t but g(H t ) = g(H 0 t ), then an external collision is said to have occurred.
As indicated above, the initial value, compression function, and output transformation can depend on the secret key. If key bits are included in the rst message blocks, this corresponds to keying the initial value; while it is not exactly the same, for the purpose of our analysis this will be considered to be equivalent 7] . If the message formatting or padding results in the inclusion of key bits in the nal message input blocks to be processed, this opens the question where the output transformation g starts. For subsequent analysis (and reasons to become apparent in the sequel), the output transformation g is de ned to begin with the rst block i which contains (any partial) keying material in the message input x i .
Lemma 1 An internal collision for an iterated MAC algorithm can be used to obtain a veri able MAC forgery with a chosen text attack requiring only one requested MAC.
Proof: For an internal collision (x; x 0 ), note that h(x k y) = h(x 0 k y) (1) for any single block y. Thus requesting a MAC for the single chosen text x k y, permits forgery { the MAC for x 0 k y is the same (since the MAC algorithm is deterministic). This assumes that both x and x 0 ll entire b-bit blocks; otherwise the padding has to be taken into account.
The observation of Lemma 1, made in a conference paper 41] submitted in February 1995, has also appeared in a Spring 1995 note 32].
It follows that a security requirement for MACs is that it should be infeasible for an adversary to nd internal collisions. This is somewhat analogous to collision resistance for hash functions. The attack of Lemma 1 can be precluded by making the output transformation g di erent for each MAC calculation, e.g., by including a sequence number or a su ciently large random number in the computation of g. For example, the MD5 padding method could be augmented by including immediately prior to the length eld in the nalblock padding an appropriately-sized random bit eld. Also, appending a length eld within the output transformation would impose the restriction that the messages x and x 0 used in the attack are of the same length.
In the remainder of this paper, it will be assumed that the output transformation g(:) and the compression function f (i.e. both f(:; x i ) for xed x i and f(H i?1 ; :) for xed H i?1 ) are either random permutations or random functions, but in both cases, deterministic once they have been chosen. In the rst case, this means that they are chosen with uniform probability among the set of all permutations on the domain D. In the latter case, this means that they are chosen with uniform probability among the set of all functions mapping their domain D to their range R; the main property required of f is that two di erent inputs will have colliding outputs with probability close to 1=jRj (here jRj denotes the size of R).
If this probability is signi cantly larger for some elements in the domain, this can usually be exploited by the cryptanalyst to improve the attacks described here; in one case this is a disadvantage to him (this exception is clari ed below).
Proposition 1 Let h be an iterated MAC with n-bit chaining variable and m-bit result, and an output transformation g that is a permutation. An internal collision for h can be found using an expected number of u = If the number of internal collisions is at least 1, the attack (of Lemma 1) succeeds. It fails only if there is no internal collision, which happens with probability Pr(c = 0) = exp(? ) = 1=e. Such a failure can be easily detected, because all u MAC pairs are distinct in this case. Moreover, the failure probability of the attack decreases exponentially when u increases: if u = p 2 2 n=2 , the failure probability becomes exp(? 2 ). For example, = 2 yields a failure probability of 1=e 4 , and = 4 results in a failure probability of 1=e 
Proof: The distribution of internal collisions is identical to that for the proof of Proposition 1, which implies that again a single internal collision is expected. As g is a random function from n-bit to m-bit strings, the number of external collisions expected is
(If g results in more (less) collisions than a random mapping, a larger (smaller) number of external collisions will occur; the attack remains the same in principle, but the number of chosen texts required varies as will become clear.) Additional work is now required { for a veri able forgery { to distinguish the internal collision from the external collisions (since Lemma 1 requires internal collisions). This may be done by appending a string y to both elements of each collision pair and checking whether the corresponding MACs are equal, requiring 2(t 1 + 1) chosen text-MAC requests. For an internal collision both results will always be equal; for an external collision this will be so with probability 1=2 m in the case that f is a permutation for xed x i . On the other hand, if f is a random mapping for xed x i , the probability that both MACs are equal is
where q 1 is the number of blocks in y. Assume q = 1, in which case 2=2 m = 2 ?m+1 is an upper bound on the probability (3); this upper bound will be used for the remainder of the proof. The attacker now discards collision pairs corresponding to unequal MACs. The expectation is that after this stage, at most t 2 = 2 n?2m+1 external collision pairs plus the one internal collision pair remain. These however cannot yet be distinguished if the (total) number of remaining collision pairs is 2 or more. More generally, if n ? 2m + 1 > 0, further external collisions must be ltered by appending a di erent y, and continuing with further ltering stages until only a single collision remains (t i 0), which with high probability is an internal collision. The expected number of ltering stages required is de ned by the smallest such that ( 
for m 1. The proof is completed by noting that instead of working stage by stage, one can eliminate the collision pairs one by one; if a pair survives after stages, it is declared to be an internal collision. As a consequence, not all of the 2 n?m external collisions need be processed: if there are j internal collisions (an event with probability Pr(c = j) = e ?1 =j!), about 1 in j + 1 external collisions must be processed before one expects to nd a rst internal collision. The expected number which must be eliminated through processing can then be approximated by 
B. Extended Results with Common Trailing Blocks
The attack outlined in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 yields an internal collision (x; x 0 ). If x and x 0 have a common sequence of s trailing blocks and if the compression function f is a permutation (for xed x i ), the collision must occur at H t?s , i.e. just before the common blocks. After deleting the s common blocks in x and x 0 , one still has an internal collision. In this case the attack can be enhanced since this provides additional freedom in the choice of the text forged by the method of Lemma 1. In particular, if x and x 0 have the same length one can obtain a forgery on a text of that length. As a signi cant consequence, in this case the attack cannot be precluded by prepending the length of the input before the MAC calculation or by xing the length of the input. Lemma 2 Let h be an iterated MAC with n-bit chaining variable, a compression function f that is a random function (for xed x i ), and an output transformation g that is a permutation. Consider a set of r 2 distinct messages which have the last s blocks in common, with r 2 n . The probability that the set contains an internal collision for h is approximately 1 ? exp ? r(r ? 1)(s + 1) Consider now s > 0: if a chaining variable collision occurs just before the s constant blocks, or after one of the s constant blocks, this will be an internal collision. If f is a random function, then the events that no chaining variable collision occurs in the di erent iterations are independent; consequently, the probability that no internal collision occurs is equal to p s+1 , and the probability for at least one collision can be approximated by (6) .
From the expressions for s = 0 and s > 0, note that for r 1, the e ect of the common blocks corresponds to multiplying r by the factor 
Proof: It follows from Lemma 2 that for u as given above, the probability of one or more internal collisions is 1?1=e. More precisely, the number of internal collisions will be Poisson distributed with parameter = u One then obtains (7) by noting that the expected number of chosen texts can be computed as in the proof of Proposition 2, and is 2 plus 2(1?1=e) multiplied by the expected number of external collisions.
Given an internal collision with s 1 common trailing blocks, the probability that it occurs before the last w blocks is 1 ? w=(s + 1). This event can be checked with a small number of additional chosen texts. Again the attack still works if one appends an arbitrary block y after the internal collision rather than at the end. This means that an attacker can replace or delete w s trailing blocks, and that the attack is applicable even if the input is of xed length or if the length is prepended to the input (cf. 5]). known texts and about 83 000 chosen texts. By exploiting the internal structure of MAA, these results can be further improved: about 2 17 chosen texts of 256 Kbyte allow a MAC forgery 42, 44] ; no known texts are required. The forgery attack can also be extended to a key recovery attack, and it leads to the de nition of weak keys for MAA 42, 44] . Note that the designer of MAA realized that its compression function not being a bijection might lead to weaknesses, motivating a special mode in ISO 8731-2 28] for messages longer than 1024 bytes. However, it turns out that the above attack is applicable to this mode as well. This is apparently the rst attack on MAA which is more e cient than an exhaustive key search or guessing the MAC.
IV. Application of General MAC Forgery Attacks
This section discusses the security of several proposed MAC algorithms constructed from unkeyed hash functions. First the secret pre x and secret su x methods are considered.
Forgery on the envelope method is then examined. Recall that these methods were reviewed in Section II.
A. Secret Pre x Method
It is well-known that the secret pre x method is insecure: a single text-MAC pair contains information essentially equivalent to the secret key, independent of the key size. An attacker may append any blocks to the message and update the MAC accordingly, using the old MAC as the initial chaining variable (taking into account the padding if necessary). The messages for which an attacker can compute the MAC are restricted to those having known texts as pre x, but this is a weak restriction. The appending attack may be precluded if only a subset of the hash output bits are used as the MAC (e.g. m = n=2 as for MD2.5 below), or by prepending the length of the message before hashing 49]. However, relying on a prepended length for security appears to make additional demands on the properties of the hash function. Moreover, because the compression function in MD4-based hash functions is of the form H i = E x i (H i?1 )+H i?1 (addition here is modulo 2 32 ) which behaves as a random function (for xed x i ), the attack noted following Proposition 3 still applies for s 1. A variation of the pre x method with MD5 is used in Kerberos V5, under the name MD2. 5 35] . The 128-bit key K 1 is derived from a 56-bit DES key K by using DES as a keystream generator in Output Feedback Mode (OFB) with IV = 0. The MAC consists of the leftmost 64 bits of the 128-bit hash result. While the expansion does not preclude an exhaustive search for the DES key, it appears to provide some bene t. In addition, revealing only 64 bits of the hash result prevents simply appending one or more blocks to allow update of the MAC. However, the technique of Proposition 3 still applies if s 1 and there is an internal collision before the last block (w 1). Also, it remains conceivable that one could append carefully chosen blocks at the end in such a way that the new MAC depends only on the 64 known bits, implying that choosing m < n imposes additional conditions on the hash function beyond those for which it was designed or has yet been analyzed. An unfortunate additional drawback is that, while one advantage of an MD5-based MAC over a DES-CBC MAC is avoidance of block ciphers and associated export issues, DES is nonetheless required for key expansion in MD2.5. Finally, the threat of exhaustive key search 52] may be of concern due to the (relatively short) 56-bit key.
B. Secret Su x Method
A concern with the secret su x method is that an o -line collision attack on the hash function may be used to obtain an internal collision. Therefore by a birthday attack, nding a pair (x; x 0 ) such that h(x) = h(x 0 ) is possible in expected (2 n=2 ) o -line operations; Lemma 1 may then be applied. The candidate inputs in a collision search can also be chosen from an adversary-controlled set. Furthermore, this method is weak if an (o -line) second preimage attack on the underlying hash function is feasible { given one known text-MAC pair, a second hash function preimage (for that text) allows an existential MAC forgery. If t text-MAC pairs are known, nding a MAC second preimage requires 2 n =t rather than 2 n o -line trials; here, if the length of the message is not appended, t is the total number of blocks rather than the number of messages. The concern of o -line collision search also applies to DES MAC MD5 of 35], which consists of applying CBC-MAC to the image under MD5 of the data input.
C. Envelope Method
The envelope method used with MD4-based hash functions (see Section IV.A) is subject to the forgery of Lemma 1 regardless of the bitlength of the lead and trail keys. More speci cally, Proposition 3 applies with m = n = 128 (assume the last block consists of K 2 only). For s = 2 16 , one chosen text and 2 56:5 known text-MAC pairs are required. Consequently, the key size k 1 + k 2 gives a misleading impression of the security for this scheme.
If K 2 is simply appended to the message, the last two blocks processed by the hash function will consist of some message bits followed by K 2 , some padding bits and the length of the message (for more details, see Section V.B). In this case, the output transformation begins with the block containing some bits of K 2 . The forgery attack works in the restricted case that all known messages are of the same length, and the message bits involved in the output transformation are constant.
V. Key Recovery Attacks
Three partitionable MAC key recovery attacks are presented below; one can consider these to be divide-and-conquer attacks as they allow to rst recover the rst half of the key (independent of the second half), and then to recover the second half by exhaustive search. The rst two apply to variants of the envelope method. The last is a key recovery attack on CBC-MAC-Y, a strengthened variation of CBC-MAC 2, 29]. The section concludes with a note on how a statistical cryptanalytic technique which fails against an underlying unkeyed hash function might nonetheless succeed against a MAC construction (e.g. the envelope method) based thereon.
A. Divide and Conquer Exhaustive-Search Key Recovery on
operations, eliminating all trial key values not yielding a collision before the last block (i.e. an internal collision). 3 Slightly over k 1 =n internal collisions are required to determine K 1 uniquely; two su ce for k 1 = n. Once K 1 is known, the envelope method is e ectively reduced to the (secret su x) method wherein a secret key is only appended and which is vulnerable to an o -line exhaustive search for K 2 .
Proposition 4 indicates that using K 1 6 = K 2 o ers substantially less additional security than one might suppose, relative to the k 1 bits of security resulting when K 1 = K 2 . The attack does however require an unreasonably large number of known text-MAC pairs. Moreover, these texts must have equal length if the length is included in the padding bits.
B. Slice-by-Slice Key Recovery of Trail Key in Envelope Method
This section presents a key recovery attack against the trailing key K 2 in the envelope method. This includes the case where K 1 = K 2 of the method proposed in Internet RFC 1828 38] (and 32])) described in Section II. The attack exploits the padding procedure of MD5, which was not designed to conceal secret keys. It also applies to any hash function with a similar trailing padding technique. The attack again requires a very large number of known text-MAC pairs (variable depending on choices made, but on the order of 2 64 assuming 128-bit chaining variables); the work complexity for key recovery is on this same order, albeit dramatically less than exhaustive search.
Recall the padding procedure for MD5 for a message input y of bitlength`, where`=jyj. A single`1' bit is appended to y, followed by z`0' bits (0 z 511), where z is chosen to make the sum of`and the bitlength of the padding equal 448 mod 512. The 64-bit integer representation of`is then appended to complete the last block. For the special case of the IPsec envelope method with a 128-bit key, the data, after padding, processed by the compression function of MD5 has the form: KkpkxkKk1000 : : :000k`. Here x is the message on which a MAC is desired, y = KkpkxkK, and`= 512 + 128+ jxj. De ne an internal collision as a pair of inputs (x; x 0 ) which produce the same MAC output, and for which the internal chaining variables collide just before the block containing the key (or any partial key). Since such a collision is detectable only through a collision for the MAC, all blocks following the internal collision must be identical in the two members of the colliding input pair. Therefore the attack of Proposition 3 requires the lengths of all the messages to be equal, and the last r message bits (which are either in the last or in the second last block) to be the same. If r = 0 (i.e. jxj= 0 mod 512), there is no condition on the last message bits.
Consider the case r = 511 (i.e. z = 320). There is a single key bit in the second last block. Therefore 511 message bits in the second last block must be identical to allow for identi cation of an internal collision. However, if that key bit is simply guessed, the unknown key is restricted to the last block, and collisions after the second last block are again internal collisions (or almost internal collisions). A rst observation is that this reduces the constraint on the message. A more signi cant consequence is that by using the attack of Lemma 1, one can actually verify the guess for that key bit. This leads to a powerful divide and conquer attack (or partitionable attack) against the key which may be illustrated as follows.
Let x be a 480-bit message. Then r=480, z=351, and the rst block contains the padded key K. The second block contains 480 message bits and 32 key bits. The last block contains the 96 remaining key bits, a`1' bit followed by 351`0' bits, and the 64-bit length eld`=1120 ( , no other pairs of MACs will be equal. This reveals 32 key bits. For the external collision, with overwhelming probability none of the pairs gives the same MAC.
It is easy to extend the attack to nd further key bits. One possibility is to repeat the above procedure using messages of length 448 bits, yielding the next 32 key bits. The remaining 64 key bits are then most e ciently found (o -line) exhaustively. Alternatively, one could begin with messages of this length, which would require 2 66 chosen texts, but reveal 64 bits of the key immediately. This reasoning allows the following result, which is stated for clarity speci cally with respect to Internet RFC 1828, but is easily seen to be a more general result:
Proposition 5 There exists a key recovery attack on the (RFC 1828) envelope method which uses q = d64=de steps (1 d 64) to nd 64 bits of the key.
Step i (1 i q) The new key recovery attack, relative to a larger 128-bit key, requires substantially fewer known texts (and time); this indicates that the general construction fails to make good use of key bits. The above attack requires that jxj mod 512 2 448; 511], because the number of bits of K in the penultimate block must be between 1 and 64; and that the known texts have the same number of blocks, because the value of`must be the same for the two messages forming the internal collision. However, if a set of about 2 73 \short" (say ten or fewer blocks) known messages is available, one expects to nd among those a su cient number of messages suitable for the attack (without xing d in advance); the attack will still require a much smaller number (less than 2 20 ) of chosen texts to identify the key bits.
The attack relies on the key being split across blocks. While it is not practical, vulnerability to it represents a certi cational weakness, and indicates an architectural aw. It is certainly one of the reasons for the fact that SSL 3.0 25] has replaced the MAC algorithm of RFC 1828 (that was used in Secure Sockets Layer SSL 2.0) by HMAC 8] . One concludes it is more secure to isolate the entire trailing key in a separate block (together with the message length and possibly a pseudo-random string). However, this requires changing the padding procedure for MD5, contravening an original motivating factor { being able to call the underlying hash function directly; an alternative is to use two nested calls as in the HMAC construction 8]. Nonetheless, customized MACs (as suggested in 32, 41]) appear to o er a more secure alternative to constructions relying directly on unkeyed hash functions.
This attack does not contradict the security proof for this scheme given by Bellare et al. 7] , because the required number of known or chosen texts is larger than their security bound.
C. Key Recovery on CBC-MAC-Y (ANSI X9.19{ISO/IEC 9797)
CBC-MAC-Y is a modi cation of CBC-MAC (see Section II) intended to increase the security. It replaces the processing of the last block from E K 1 (x t H t?1 ) to a two-key triple encryption:
Aside from precluding the existential forgery attack noted in Section II, this is intended to prevent an exhaustive key search attack on K 1 . This is a particular concern when DES is used as the block cipher E, because its key is only 56 bits 52]. However, a new divide and conquer (or partitionable) key recovery attack is possible provided (e.g. in the case m = n) 2 known texts of at most t blocks each (t 2) and exhaustive search involving at most (2t ? 1) 2 k encryptions, where k =jK 1 j=jK 2 j, k n, and m = n. Note 4: If triple encryption (e.g. triple-DES CBC-MAC) is used at each stage in the MAC operation, Proposition 6 does not apply. However, an output transformation is required to prevent the existential forgery attack on CBC-MAC described in Section II. Moreover, the basic forgery attack of Proposition 1 does apply and the complexity (about 2 32 known texts and 1 chosen text for n = 64) is independent of the key size.
D. Statistical Cryptanalysis of Envelope MACs
Even if the above attacks are precluded in some way, one should keep in mind that the attacks are independent of possible weaknesses of the hash function. More sophisticated attacks might be found which exploit such weaknesses, even if they do not in uence the onewayness or collision resistance of the hash function (see for example 3]). As an example, consider the envelope method with a 128-bit key K; the remaining message input is under control of an attacker. Assume that there exists a number of probabilistic relations between the key bits in the data input and the bits of the MAC. Linear cryptanalysis, as proposed by M. Matsui 36, 37] could then be used to recover part of the key K using a number of known text-MAC pairs (for example, 2 40 known text-MAC pairs might allow one to recover 60 bits of K). The remaining 68 bits could then be found by exhaustive search. Note that this type of attack is completely di erent from a (second) preimage attack, where an opponent only knows the hash result and possibly a single preimage. Here, he has at his disposal 2 40 hash results, for which he knows the complete input except for the 128 input bits of K, which are the same in all these cases. This scenario illustrates another important point: the assumption that the complete output of the compression function is unpredictable when part of it is keyed (on which the security proof of 7] is based), is quite a di erent property than collision resistance or (2nd) preimage resistance. It should be noted that the open literature contains no analysis of existing hash functions with respect to the former property. Table 2 gives the number of text-MAC pairs required by the best known attacks on MAA and on CBC-MAC with m-bit result (using a block cipher such as DES with n = 64). The weaknesses of the proposals based on hash functions of Section IV are summarized in Table 3 . Storage requirements (e.g. for known text-MAC pairs) have been omitted, as well as the potential improvements due to common trailing blocks as discussed in Section III. The tabulated values, corresponding to the best known attacks, give upper bounds on the security of these constructions. Depending on the parameters, nding a second preimage may be easier by rst obtaining the key with an exhaustive search; this type of attack is not noted in the table.
VI. Discussion of Results
If the underlying hash function is collision resistant (implying n is su ciently large), the gures in Table 3 (aside from the secret pre x method without additional precautions) indicate that the corresponding attacks are only certi cational { breaking these schemes is easier than breaking an ideal MAC with the same parameters, although the attacks are clearly infeasible in practice. In particular, the number of known or chosen texts required is much smaller than would be ideal, and known texts can be replaced by o -line computations. It is however clear from Table 3 that if the hash function is only a one-way hash function (with n typically between 64 and 80 bits), then both the su x and envelope methods are vulnerable as well. Also, it follows that in case of the envelope method k 1 must not be too small. Table 3 : Security of 3 proposals to build n-bit MACs (n = m) from hash functions. \#MAC" is the number of known text-MAC pairs; \C" the number of chosen texts; \#opn" the number of o -line compression function operations required for best known attacks; t is the number of messages (or blocks) available to an attacker; k, k 1 Even if keys are chosen su ciently large that these attacks are computationally infeasible, one should keep in mind the attacks are independent of possible weaknesses of the hash function. More sophisticated attacks might be found which exploit such weaknesses (cf. Section V.D). This is a particular concern in light of recent techniques which allowed collisions to be found for MD4, and for two rounds of RIPEMD 18, 19] .
VII. Concluding Remarks
The new forgery attack on iterated MACs requires expected (2 n=2 ) known text-MAC pairs and expected (2 n?m ) chosen texts, where m is the bitlength of the hash result and n is that of the chaining variable. Thus a square-root attack applies to MACs as in many other cryptographic problems (albeit the square root is in the number of texts required). A naive non-veri able attack always succeeds with probability 2 ?k by guessing the k-bit key and computing the MAC, or 2 ?m by guessing the MAC. These attack scenarios di er, but nonetheless suggest using n = 2m and k m. An important conclusion is that the attack can be avoided by varying the output transformation using a sequence number or a random number, although this adds the inconvenience that this latter value must be separately available for use in veri cation of the MAC.
The new attack may pose a relatively serious threat to certain applications of CBC-MAC (e.g. when n = m = 64), and illustrates that CBC-MAC-Y, the strengthened version of CBC-MAC in ANSI X9. 19 Table 2 . Security of MAA and CBC-MAC Table 3 . Security of 3 proposals to build n-bit MACs (n = m) from hash functions. \#MAC" is the number of known text-MAC pairs; \C" the number of chosen texts; \#opn" the number of o -line compression function operations required for best known attacks; t is the number of messages (or blocks) available to an attacker; k, k 1 , k 2 are key bitlengths.
